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THE PATRIOT ACT GRAND JURY 
DISCLOSURE EXCEPTION: A PROPOSAL 
FOR RECONCILING CIVIL LIBERTY AND 









 The passage of the Uniting & Strengthening of Americans by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 20011 (“Patriot 
Act”) following the September 11 attacks has raised endless questions involving the 
constitutionality and effectiveness of criminal procedure modifications that depart from 
traditional methods.2  Congress hastily passed the Patriot Act to enhance law 
                                                 
1 107 P. L. 56, 15 Stat. 272, Oct. 26, 2001.  
 
2 These concerns are best highlighted in an excerpt from a New York Times editorial a 
day after the September 11 attacks. 
 
There must be an exacting examination of how the country can face this 
threat without sacrificing its liberties. . . . Americans must rethink how to 
safeguard the country without bartering away the rights and privileges of 
the free society that we are defending.  The temptation will be great in the 
days ahead to write draconian new laws that give law enforcement 
agencies - or even military forces - a right to undermine the civil liberties 
that shape the character of the United States.  President Bush and 
Congress must carefully balance the need for heightened security with the 
need to protect the constitutional rights of Americans.  That includes 
Americans of Islamic descent, who could now easily became the target for 
another period of American xenophobia and ethnic discrimination. 
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enforcement’s authority to target and prosecute domestic and international security 
threats.3  Consequently, many criminal procedure measures that had governed law 
enforcement investigations were modified, allowing law enforcement authorities greater 
latitude in the pursuit of criminal activity.4  This Paper focuses on the Patriot Act’s 
amendment of Section 203 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to allow the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Editorial, The War Against America; The National Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, 
at A-26. See also, Jim McGee, An Intelligence Giant in the Making, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 
2001, at A4. 
      
3 See Jennifer Van Bergen, Repeal the Patriot Act, TRUTHOUT ISSUES, Apr. 12, 2001, 
available at, http://www.truthout.org/docs_02/04.02A.JVB.Patriot.htm (last visited, Feb. 
28, 2004) (discussing the fact that the Patriot Act generally and its passage with little, if 
any, debate in Congress). See Editorial Anti-terror act extends, not creates, powers 
 
4 The main changes to the traditional criminal procedure framework are as follows: 
Section 203 amends Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(C) to permit sharing of 
grand jury information with other agencies if it involves foreign intelligence information, 
as defined. It also amends 18 U. S. C. § 2517 to permit similar sharing of information 
from wiretaps.  Section 213 adds subsection (b) to 18 U. S. C. § 3103a to authorize 
delayed notice of execution of a warrant, if three conditions are met: (1) immediate notice 
would have an “adverse result,” defined as physical danger, flight from prosecution, 
destruction of evidence, intimidation of witnesses, jeopardizing investigation, or delay of 
a trial; (2) no tangible property or wire, electronic, or stored communications are to be 
seized, with exceptions; and (3) notice will be given “within a reasonable period.” 
Section 219 amends Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(a) to authorize nationwide 
search warrants in terrorism investigations. Subsection (a) amends 18 U. S. C. § 2520, 
relating to wiretapping, to provide for court referrals for administrative discipline of 
employees. It also provides that use of intercepted information beyond that authorized by 
Section 2517 is a violation for the purpose of the civil remedy of the existing § 2520(a).  
Section 412(a) adds § 236A to the Immigration and Nationality Act.  The new section 
requires the Attorney General to take into custody any alien certified to be inadmissible 
or deportable on one of six grounds: 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(i) (espionage, sabotage, 
or export restrictions); § 1182(a)(3)(A)(iii) (attempt to overthrow the government); § 
1182(a)(3)(B) (terrorist activities, amended by § 411 of the Act); and parallel provisions 
of § 1227, subdivisions (a)(4)(A)(i) & (iii) and (a)(4)(B). Section 412(b) limits judicial 
review of detentions under § 412(a) to habeas corpus. It expressly includes judicial 
review of the merits of the decision to detain, but it does not specify a standard of review. 
In most cases, the habeas petition would be in the district court in the place of detention.  
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sharing of grand-jury information with other agencies, a sharing of information that was 
traditionally prohibited. 
Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that prosecutors, 
grand jurors, and other administrative and investigatory personnel, “shall not disclose 
matters occurring before the grand jury,” except for a limited number of circumstances.5  
Historically, the federal courts have placed significant value and focus on grand jury 
integrity.6 Protecting grand jury disclosure concomitantly protects civil liberty interests.7  
These interests include but are not limited to preventing defendants from suborning 
perjury or otherwise tampering with potential witnesses, preventing defendants from 
importing the grand jurors themselves, and thereby ensuring that grand jurors can 
deliberate free from improper influence, encouraging frank disclosure from witnesses 
called before the grand jury, and protecting accused individuals later determined to be 
innocent from public censure and ridicule.8  The controversy surrounding the 
modifications to section 203 are premised on these interests.  
Section 203 amended the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to permit 
disclosures of “matters occurring before the grand jury” when the matters “involve 
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence” to “any Federal law enforcement, 
                                                 
5 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (2004). 
 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. 418 (1983); Illinois v. Abbott & 
Assocs., 460 U.S. 557  (1983); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).  
 
7 See Sara Sun Beale & James E. Felman, The Consequences of Enlisting Federal Grand 
Juries in the War on Terrorism: Assessing the USA PATRIOT Act’s Changes to Grand 
Jury Secrecy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 699, 706 (2002). 
 
8 See Fred A. Bernstein, Behind the Gray Door: Williams, Secrecy, and the Federal 
Grand Jury, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 600 (1994). 
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intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in 
order to assist the official receiving that information in the performance of his official 
duties.”9  Criminal Procedure Rule 6(e)(3)(c) governs the permissive disclosure and use 
of information revealed in a grand jury proceeding, which prior to the enactment of the 
Patriot Act could be disclosed only when directed by a court in connection with a judicial 
proceeding.10  Additionally, courts would also permit disclosure of grand jury 
information upon the request of the defendant, upon a showing that the information 
discloses a violation of a state criminal law, or when disclosed by the prosecutor to 
another grand jury.11 
 The new law requires that a disclosure made under the new exception be revealed, 
under seal, to the court.12  The term “foreign intelligence information” is defined as 
information that “relates to the ability of the United States to protect against” an actual or 
potential attack, hostile act, sabotage, international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence 
activities conducted by a foreign power or its agent, as well as information relating to the 
national defense, security, or conduct of foreign affairs of the United States.13 
 Section 203 also amended 18 U.S.C. 2517, which governs the permissive 
disclosure and use of intercepted communications.14 Under the new law, intercepted 
                                                 
9 See USA PATRIOT Act § 203(a). 
 
10 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(c) (2004). 
 
11 See id. 
 
12 See USA PATRIOT Act § 203(a). 
 
13 See id. See also Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. 
 
14 See 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (2004). 
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information related to “foreign intelligence or counterintelligence” can be disclosed to 
“any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or 
national security official” to the extent that “such disclosure is appropriate to the proper 
performance of the official duties of the officer making or receiving the disclosure.”  
Additionally, the information can be used by any officer properly in possession of the 
information to assist in the performance of his official duties.15  
Part II of this Paper discusses the grand jury and its investigatory functions and 
importance in law enforcement.  This Part discusses the functions of the grand jury and 
the traditional scheme governing federal grand juries under Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.  Additionally, the secrecy of grand jury information and its 
exceptions prior to the passage of the Patriot Act are discussed. This Part assesses the 
policy reasons for allowing more grand jury information sharing, as well as the law 
enforcement justifications for doing so.   
Part III provides a detailed analysis of how the Patriot Act exception to grand jury 
secrecy would function and the exception’s underlying policies.  Part IV discusses the 
relevant United States Supreme Court cases that relate to the grand jury’s functions and 
the secrecy exceptions and attempts to reconcile the Patriot Act exception with the 
framework and policy emphasis found in those decisions. Since the Supreme Court 
strongly emphasizes the benefit of grand jury secrecy and the potential abuse that 
disclosure would lead to, this paper advocates for the adoption of several features that 
aim to limit the abusive potential of the Patriot Act exception.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 




Ultimately, Part V proposes three revisions to the current rule: Limiting the 
agencies who have access to grand jury information, enacting guidelines limiting the 
purposes and uses of the information, and enacting a sunset provision as a way for 
Congress to reassess the utility of the new exception in due time.  Enacting these three 
proposals would better reconcile the Patriot Act exception with the Supreme Court’s 
strong policy emphasis on grand jury secrecy. 
 
II. GRAND JURIES BEFORE THE PATRIOT ACT 
The grand jury mechanism has been a central part of the criminal justice system 
since the country’s inception. The grand jury’s source of authority derives the Fifth 
Amendment of the federal constitution. The Fifth Amendment states that  
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of war or public 
danger.16  
 
Most state constitutions also constitutionalize the grand jury’s functions or at the very 
least codify them into statutes.17 The constitionalization of the grand jury’s functions is 
                                                 
16 See U.S. Const. Amend. V.  
 
17 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 190.50(5)(a) (Consol. 1996) (“When a criminal 
charge against a person is being or is about to be or has been submitted to a grand jury, 
such person has a right to appear before such grand jury as a witness in his own behalf 
. . .”).  For a discussion of the differences among state grand juries, see George H. 
Dession & Isadore H. Cohen, The Inquisitional Functions of Grand Juries, 41 YALE L.J. 
687 (1982). See also, Comment, Grand Jury - Reports - Power of Court to Cite for 
Contempt, 48 IOWA L. REV. 725, 727 (1963) (discussing the reporting function grand 
juries serve in various jurisdictions).  
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demonstrative of its central importance in the fabric of American criminal justice.18  This 
Part discusses the grand jury institution in light of its traditional functions. Additionally, 
the secrecy status of grand jury investigations prior to the Patriot Act will be addressed. 
 
A. The Grand Jury and Its General Functions 
The powers and functions of the federal grand jury differ from those of the federal 
trial jury, also known as the petit jury.19  While petit juries listen to the evidence offered 
by the prosecution and the defense during a criminal trial and returns a verdict, the grand 
jury does not determine guilt or innocence.20  The grand jury determines whether there is 
probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that a specific person or 
persons committed it.21  If the grand jury determines that probable cause is present, then 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (reiterating the 
Constitutional importance of the federal grand jury).  For a historical overview of the 
grand jury and its many functions see generally, Sara Sun Beale & James E. Felman, The 
Consequences of Enlisting Federal Grand Juries in the War on Terrorism: Assessing the 
USA Patriot Act’s Changes to Grand Jury Secrecy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 699 
(2002).  See also, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (noting that the 
functions of the historical English grand jury, protecting society from both individual and 
governmental wrongdoing, still survive in the modern day American model).  
 
19 See W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Sec. 8.12 (2003). The petit jury is also 
important in safeguarding the rights of the accused. See, e.g., Silverthorne v. United 
States, 400 F.2d 627, 634 (9th Cir. 1968) (stating that the greatest safeguard to the liberty 
of the accused is the petit jury and the rules governing its determination of a defendant’s 
guilt or innocence). 
 
20 See id. 
 
21 See id.  
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it will return a statement of the charges, the indictment.22  After such a finding, the case 
against the accused will proceed to trial. 
The grand jury normally hears only that evidence presented by the government 
which tends to demonstrate the commission of a crime.23  The grand jury must determine 
from this evidence, and generally without evaluating evidence from the defense, whether 
a person should be prosecuted for a serious federal crime.24  The Bill of Rights refers to a 
crime that carries a sentence as an “infamous crime.”25  Generally, an individual cannot 
be prosecuted for a serious crime unless the grand jury decides that evidence of probable 
cause exists.26  Therefore, the grand jury functions both as proverbial sword and shield, 
                                                 
22 See id. See also, Megan Hall, Grand Jury Provisions of the Patriot Act, available at 
www.trialbriefs.com/GrandJury.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).  
 
23 See Stephen A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra, American Criminal Procedure 706 (5th 
ed. 1996) (“The high proportion of true bills . . . is not surprising. The grand jury is 
neither a rubber stamp nor a body with no mind of its own. What it is, however, is a body 
that hears only one side of a case. And it reacts to that side. . . . The principal function of 
the grand jury today probably is not to refuse indictment, but to force the prosecution to 
gather and to offer evidence in some systematic way before a charge is brought.”). 
 
24 See id. 
 
25 See id.  
 
26 It should be noted that grand juries are not completely free to compel a trial of anyone 
it chooses.  The United States Attorney must sign the indictment before an individual is 
prosecuted.  See W. LaFave supra note 18. Additionally, a federal grand jury (except a 
special grand jury impaneled under 18 U.S.C. BB3331-3334) is not authorized to 
investigate situations involving the conduct of individuals, public officials, agencies or 




authorizing the government’s prosecution of suspected defendants, while protecting the 
citizenry from unwarranted or frivolous prosecutions.27  
As discussed, the federal grand jury’s function is to determine whether an 
individual should be tried for a serious federal crime alleged to have been committed 
within the district where the grand jury convenes.28  Matters may be brought to its 
attention in three ways: by the United States Attorney, by the court that has called it to 
duty, and from the personal knowledge of a member of the grand jury.29 In all of these 
cases, the grand jury hears and assesses evidence before making their recommendation.30 
After it has received evidence against an individual, the grand jury decides 
whether the evidence presented justifies an indictment, or “true bill,” which is the formal 
                                                 
27 But cf. Melvin P. Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 
A.B.A. J. 153, 154-55 (1965); LEWIS KATZ ET AL., JUSTICE IS THE CRIME: PRETRIAL 
DELAY IN FELONY CASES 48, 121 (1972) (stating that the grand jury is a rubber stamp for 
the prosecutor); Ovio C. Lewis, The Grand Jury: A Critical Evaluation, 13 AKRON L. 
REV. 33, 57 (1979) (stating that the grand jury is the prosecutor’s darling); Wayne L. 
Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System (Part II), 10 OR. L. REV. 217, 329 (1931) 
(stating that grand juries are likely to be a fifth wheel in the administration of criminal 
justice in that they tend to stamp with approval, and often uncritically, the wishes of the 
prosecuting attorney). 
 
28 See U.S. Const. amend. V; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
 
29 See, e.g., Bruce Zucker & Michelle Carey, Capturing the Harm: Defining “Tax Loss” 
for Use in Federal Sentencing, 15 AKRON TAX J. 1, 29 (2000) (discussing the U.S. 
attorneys involvement in grand jury proceedings involving a tax evasion case). 
 
30 See Bracy v. United States, 435 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1978) (stating the purpose of the 
grand jury to be determining whether probable cause exists to bring an accused to trial); 
United States v. DiGrazia, 213 F. Supp. 232, 235 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (“The Grand Jury exists 
as an integral part of Anglo-American jurisprudence for the express purpose of assuring 
that persons will not be charged with crimes simply because of the zeal, malice, partiality 
or other prejudice of the prosecutor, the government or private persons”). 
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criminal charge returned by the grand jury.31  Upon the indictment’s filing in court, the 
accused must either plead guilty, nolo contendere, or stand trial.32  If the evidence does 
not meet the probable cause threshold required to demonstrate that the person committed 
a crime, the grand jury will vote a “no bill,” or “not a true bill.”33 When this occurs, the 
individual at issue is not required to plead to a criminal charge, and no trial is required. 
The most important portion of the grand jury’s work is concerned with evidence 
brought to its attention by the prosecution. The grand jury may consider additional 
matters brought to its attention through different sources, but should consult with the 
United States Attorney or the court before undertaking investigations of such matters.34 
The grand jury’s investigatory power is limited by the fact that it generally has no 
investigative staff or legal assistance.35  
                                                 
31 See 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 324, at 219 
(1980).  
 
32 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 378 (2d ed. 1992). 
 
33 See, e.g., Ric Simmons, Re-Examining The Grand Jury: Is There Room For 
Democracy In The Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2002) (discussing the 
grand jury no true bill and true bill process in an early English case).  
 
34 An example of the grand jury’s reliance on the courts is when the grand jury depends 
on the court to execute its important subpoena power. See U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 
346 n.4 (stating that the grand jury may ask the court to compel production of books, 
papers, documents, and the testimony of witnesses). Courts may limit the grand jury’s 
subpoena power in certain circumstances. Id. at 346 (stating that grand jury subpoena 
power is not unlimited). The court, for instance, may quash or modify a subpoena on 
motion if it is overly broad, or if compliance would be “unreasonable or oppressive.” Id. 
at 346 n.4 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)). 
 
35 See Roger T. Brice, Comment, Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, the Trial 
Judge, and Undue Influence, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 764 (1972) (asserting that although 
the grand jury’s reliance upon professional investigatory agencies and the prosecutor to 
gather evidence has increased efficiency in investigation and decision making . . . [i]t has 
made the modern grand jury a generally more passive instrument than its precursors. 
 11 
B. Rule 6(e) and the Secrecy of Grand Jury Proceedings 
Section 203 of the USA PATRIOT Act amends Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.36  Rule 6(e) contemplates preservation of secrecy of grand jury 
proceedings.37  Secrecy has been an important component of the grand jury process since 
at least the seventeenth century, when grand jurors successfully objected to the king’s 
efforts to publicize grand jury proceedings.38  This notion of secrecy was embraced by 
the American colonies and applied to their own grand jury systems.39  Challenges to the 
principle of grand jury secrecy began almost immediately.  Courts generally sided with 
arguments from the government for the courts to uphold the government’s interest in 
maintaining the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.40  The government’s interest in 
                                                                                                                                                 
(footnote omitted)); U.S. v. Linton, 502 F. Supp. 861, 865 (D. Nev. 1980) (stating that 
“the passive role of the modern grand jury is perhaps an inevitable function of our 
complex urban society. Nevertheless, at its best the grand jury is capable of acting as 
something more than a rubber stamp.” (quoting 8 James W. Moore et al., Moore’s 
Federal Practice 6.02 1, at 6-12 (1976))). But cf. U.S. v. Kleen Laundry & Cleaners, Inc., 
381 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (“Today the grand jury’s independence in the 
criminal justice system has declined with the increasing complexity of crime and the 
growth of the role of prosecutors, professional police and investigative forces”). 
 
36 See USA PATRIOT Act § 203(a). 
 
37 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (2004). 
 
38 SUSAN W. BRENNER & GREGORY G. LOCKHART, FEDERAL GRAND JURY: A GUIDE TO 
LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.02 (1996). See also Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an 
American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 
13 (1996) 
 
39 See Sara Sun Beale & James E. Felman, The Consequences of Enlisting Federal Grand 
Juries in the War on Terrorism: Assessing the USA Patriot Act’s Changes to Grand Jury 
Secrecy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 699 (2002). 
 
40 See also Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its 
History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1996). 
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secrecy in a particular instance would outweigh and trump the defendant’s need for 
access to those proceedings.41 Rule 6(e) later codified the common law notion of 
secrecy.42 
In essence, Rule 6(e) orders prosecutors and grand jurors, although not witnesses 
themselves, to keep information related to a grand jury investigation secret.43  The 
general secrecy provision under Rule 6(e)(2) provides that these individuals, and other 
administrative and investigatory personnel,  
shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as 
otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of secrecy may be 
imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. A knowing 
violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.44 
 
A difficult point of contention and confusion amongst courts involves the definition of 
what constitutes “matters occurring before the grand jury.”45  What is clear, however, is 
                                                 
41 See id.  
  
42 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (2004). 
 
43 See id. 
 
44 Id.  
 
45 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 103 F.3d at 238-39 (discussing meaning of 
“matters occurring before the grand jury”); SEC v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 
1382 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Kluger), 827 F.2d 868, 
874) (2d Cir. 1987) (recognizing tax materials as privileged, thus requiring showing of 
particularized need before further disclosure would be granted); Texas v. U.S. Steel 
Corp., 546 F.2d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding transcript of corporate employee’s 
testimony entitled to grand jury secrecy). See also, Andrea M. Nervi, Comment, FRCRP 
6(e) and the Disclosure of Documents Reviewed by a Grand Jury, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 
221, 226 (1990) (“Certain classes of materials, such as transcripts of grand jury 
proceedings and the names of witnesses testifying before the grand jury, are clearly 
‘matters occurring before the grand jury.’ But once we move beyond these areas of 




the fact that any testimony given before the grand jury may not be disclosed to anyone 
except under very limited circumstances.46 These limited circumstanced constitute the 
exceptions to the general secrecy provision. 
  
C. Exceptions to Secrecy Under Rule 6(e) 
 Several basic exceptions to grand jury disclosure exist under Rule 6(e). For 
instance, Rule 6 contemplates disclosure made to “an attorney for the government for use 
in the performance of such attorney’s duty.”47 Additionally, disclosures can be made to 
“such government personnel . . . as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the 
government to assist an attorney for the government in the performance of such 
attorney’s duty to enforce federal criminal law.”48 These exceptions to secrecy are 
necessary for the grand jury process to function properly. The purpose of disclosure 
under these exceptions is to assist the government’s attorney “in the performance of such 
attorney’s duty to enforce federal criminal law.”49 
 Even under these seemingly necessary exceptions to secrecy, “[a]n attorney for 
the government shall promptly provide the district court, before which was impaneled the 
grand jury whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to whom 
such disclosure has been made, and shall certify that the attorney has advised such 
                                                 
46 See id.  
 
47 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (2004). 
 
48 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3) (2004). 
 
49 See id.  
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persons of their obligation of secrecy under this rule.”50 Other non-controversial 
exceptions to secrecy include disclosure by a government attorney to another federal 
grand jury51 and (when approved by a federal court) disclosure by a government attorney 
to a state official upon a showing that the grand jury information will disclose a violation 
of state criminal law.52 
Over the past three decades, the grand jury secrecy rules have been further 
amended to reflect changes in the law enforcement environment.53  Many of these 
secrecy exceptions contemplate judicial supervision.54  This judicial supervision is said to 
curtail potential abuses related to the dissemination of grand jury information.55  Prior to 
1985, federal courts were limited in their authority to order disclosure of grand jury 
material. Disclosure could be ordered in connection with a judicial proceeding where a 
                                                 
50 See id.  
 
51 See id. 
 
52 See id. 
 
53 It should be noted that there have also been unsuccessful efforts to expand the 
disclosure provisions pertaining to grand jury materials. One proposed expansion would 
have permitted disclosure of grand jury materials concerning a federal health care offense 
to an attorney for the government for “use in any investigation or civil proceeding related 
to health care fraud.” See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-350, pt. 2, at 1185 (1995). The 
proposal passed both the House of Representatives and the Senate, but was eliminated 
from the final bill in conference. See id. A second proposal would have allowed 
disclosure of grand jury material to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
where the information involved conduct that might violate federal securities laws. See S. 
REP. NO. 101-337, at 4 (1990). Although disclosure of grand jury information would have 
assisted the SEC and the agencies that regulate federal health care programs, presumably 
this need was deemed insufficient to justify erosion of the wall of secrecy surrounding 
grand jury proceedings. 
 
54 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(c)(i) (2004). 
 
55 147 CONG. REC. S10993 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
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party was able to make a “strong showing of particularized need” for the grand jury 
materials.56  Requests for secrecy exemptions in a grand jury investigation under this 
strict framework were and still are seldom granted.57  Another instance where court 
approval is required is “upon a showing [by the defendant] that grounds may exist for a 
motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury.”58 
 
D. Policies Underlying Grand Jury Secrecy 
The court’s supervision and involvement in the grand jury secrecy exception 
process has several identifiable underlying policies. These policies have been articulated 
and advanced by courts confronted with questions involving grand jury information 
disclosure. The reviewing court functions as gatekeeper in upholding these policies.  
Four policies have been advanced to justify grand jury secrecy: 
• To prevent the accused from escaping before he is indicted and arrested or from 
tampering with adversarial witnesses;59 
                                                 
56 See U.S. v. Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. 418, 420 (1983). 
 
57 The Supreme Court has insisted that private parties seeking grand jury transcripts 
demonstrate that without the transcript or reference to it a defense would be greatly 
prejudiced or an injustice committed.  The showing of need for the transcripts must be 
made “with particularity” so that the secrecy of the proceedings may be lifted discretely 
and limitedly. See, e.g., United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-682 
(1958). See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
 
58 See United States v. Amazon Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254 (D. Md. 1931). 
 





• To prevent disclosure of derogatory information presented to the grand jury 
against an accused who has not been indicted;60 
• To encourage complainants and witnesses to come before the grand jury and 
speak freely without fear that their testimony will be made public thereby 
subjecting them to possible discomfort or retaliation;61 and  
• To encourage the grand jurors to engage in uninhibited investigation and 
deliberation by barring disclosure of their votes and comments during the 
proceedings.62  
These policies have been applied in many requests for judicial approval of grand 
jury discretion. For instance, Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest,63 several oil 
companies sought review of a judgment, which ordered disclosure of grand jury 
transcripts related to a government investigation of petitioners. The case involved gas 
retailers who charged petitioners with conspiring to restrain trade in gasoline in violation 
of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.64  Petitioners asserted that the grand jury court applied 
the wrong standard to determine whether disclosure was proper under Fed. R. Crim. P. 
6(e), and the grand jury court was the wrong court to decide whether disclosure was 
proper because it did not know whether disclosure was necessary for the civil antitrust 
proceedings.  
                                                 
60 See id.  
 
61 See id. 
 
62 See id. 
 
63 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979).  
 
64 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1, 2.  
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In reviewing the lower court’s approval of grand jury disclosure, the Supreme 
Court held respondents, in seeking grand jury transcripts, had to show the material sought 
was necessary to avoid possible injustice in the civil case, the need for disclosure was 
greater than the need for continued secrecy, and their request was structured to cover only 
material so needed.  The Court also held the grand jury court abused its discretion in 
granting disclosure where it was largely ignorant of the necessity of disclosure to the civil 
proceedings.  
The essence of the Supreme Court’s holding in Douglas Oil centered on the 
policies underlying grand jury secrecy.  Along these lines the Court expressly stated that  
if preindictment proceedings were made public, many prospective 
witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that 
those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony. 
Moreover, witnesses who appeared before the grand jury would be less 
likely to testify fully and frankly, as they would be open to retribution 
as well as inducements. There also would be the risk that those about 
to be indicted would flee, or would try to influence individual grand 
jurors to vote against the indictment. Finally, by preserving the secrecy 
of the proceedings, we assure that persons who are accused but 
exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule.65 
 
Consequently, the Supreme Court itself recognized that it “must always be reluctant to 
conclude that a breach of secrecy has been authorized.”66  As will be demonstrated, the 
new amendments to Rule 6(e) allow for easier access to grand jury information and 
signify a departure from the secrecy policies in favor of national security. 
                                                 
65 See 441 U.S. at 219.  
 
66 United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 425 (1983). For other discussions of 
the importance of grand jury secrecy, see, e.g., United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 
292, 299 (1991); In re Petition of Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1997); Matter of 
EyeCare Physicians of Am., 100 F.3d 514, 518 (7th Cir. 1996); In re North, 16 F.3d 





III. THE AMENDMENT TO RULE 6(E) UNDER THE PATRIOT ACT 
As was discussed in the previous section, the Patriot Act departs from the grand 
jury secrecy rules and its exceptions. The Act permits disclosure to federal agencies 
without court approval.67 The material disclosed must relate to foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence, and the Act defines those terms with considerable breadth. The scope 
of the Patriot Act’s grand jury secrecy exceptions will be important in light of assessing 
whether the act can be reconciled with existing Supreme Court precedent.68 
The Act changes the secrecy rules by amending the disclosure provisions of Rule 
6(e)(3)(C) to permit disclosure of grand jury matters involving “foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence . . . or foreign intelligence information . . . to any Federal law 
enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security 
official in order to assist the official receiving that information in the performance of his 
official duties.”69   The Act requires that within a reasonable time after a disclosure under 
the new provision, “an attorney for the government shall file under seal a notice with the 
court stating the fact that such information was disclosed and the departments, agencies, 
or entities to which the disclosure was made.”70  
                                                 
67 Some of these administrative agencies are unrelated to law enforcement. This point 
will be addressed infra at text accompanying notes 121-24. 
 
68 See infra notes 115-24 and accompanying text. 
 
69 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
§ 203(a)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 279 (2001). 
 
70 Id. § 203(a), 115 Stat. at 279. 
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Both the Act and amended rule define the term “foreign intelligence” by reference 
to the National Security Act of 1947 to include “information relating to the capabilities, 
intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign 
organizations, or foreign persons.”71  The term “counterintelligence” is likewise defined 
by reference to the National Security Act, as “information gathered and activities 
conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or 
assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, 
foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.”72  The 
PATRIOT Act itself broadly defines “foreign intelligence information” to include:  
(I) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, 
that relates to the ability of the United States to protect against-  
(aa) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; 
(bb) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power; or 
(cc) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or 
network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or 
(II) information, whether or not coming from a United States 
person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that 
relates to--  
(aa) the national defense or the security of the United States; or 
(bb) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.73  
 
Under the Act, three important restrictions are placed on the disclosure: the 
official who receives the information may only use it in the course of his official duties; 
the use is “subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information”; 
and “within a reasonable time after such disclosure, an attorney for the government shall 
                                                 
71 § 203(a)(1), 115 Stat at 279-80, citing 50 U.S.C. § 401a(2) (1994). 
 





file under seal a notice with the court stating the fact that such information was 
disclosed” and the departments to which it was disclosed.74 Furthermore, the statute does 
not list all of the federal agencies to which disclosure is permitted under the amended 
rule.75 
Expressions of Congressional intent underlying the new exceptions to grand jury 
secrecy are relatively scant.76  The original House and Senate versions contained 
dissimilar versions of the grand jury exception. The House version allowed disclosure of 
grand jury information only when authorized by a court.77 The Senate version contained 
no requirement of prior judicial authorization or even of subsequent judicial 
notification.78  The main Congressional debate centered on the judicial authorization 
requirement.79  This was also a point of contention between the White House and the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, ultimately resulting in a compromise mandating only 
                                                 
74 USA PATRIOT Act § 203(a)(1), 115 Stat. at 279 (2001). 
 
75 See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text. 
 
76 This is due in large part to the hasty manner in which the Patriot Act was enacted. 
President Bush submitted his anti-terrorism legislation to Congress on September 19, 
2001, and signed the final version of the bill on October 26, 2001. See Martha Mendoza, 
New Anti-Terror Law Brings Consternation: Security Officials and Lawyers Scramble to 
Decipher Complex Provisions: Federal Guidance is in Short Supply, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
16, 2001, at A4 (noting that Congress held no hearings on the bill that became the 
PATRIOT Act, resulting in very limited legislative history). 
 
77 See,  H.R. 2975, 107th Congress, § 353 (2001). 
 
78 See S. 1510, 107th Congress, § 203 (2001). 
 
79 See 147 CONG. REC. S11002 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). See 
also John Lancaster, Anti-Terrorism Bill Hits Snag on the Hill, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 
2001, at A6; Stewart Baker, Grand Jury Secrecy Rules Help the Terrorists, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 5, 2001, at A14 (stating that senate negotiators stalled the entire bill over proposal 
authorizing broader disclosure of grand jury information). 
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judicial notification.80  Ultimately, the compromise was said to “maintain some degree of 
judicial oversight of the dissemination of grand jury information.”81 
 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND GRAND JURY SECRECY 
In interpreting Rule 6(e), the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the 
importance of preserving the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.  A review of the main 
Supreme Court cases relating to grand jury secrecy demonstrates the Supreme Court’s 
emphasis on the policies underlying grand jury secrecy. Essentially, the Court has 
exercised a gatekeeper function by balancing the interests disclosure and secrecy.  
In an early case, United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.,82 the government sought 
review of a lower federal court order, which dismissed the government’s case filed under 
the Sherman Act against corporations when the government refused to release a grand 
jury transcript to the corporations.83  The government filed a civil suit against the 
corporations relating to antitrust violations pursuant to 15 U.S.C.S. § 4 after a grand jury 
failed to return an indictment in a prior criminal proceeding.84  The government used the 
grand jury transcript to prepare for the civil trial, and the corporations requested the same 
                                                 
80 See Lancaster, supra note 70.  
 
81 147 CONG. REC. S10993 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 
82 356 U.S. 677 (1958). 
 
83 See id. at 678. 
 




privilege.85  The corporations moved for discovery and production of the minutes.86 The 
district court granted the motion, holding that the corporations had shown good cause.87 
The government was directed to produce the transcript, but it refused to obey the 
order and filed a motion requesting the orders be amended to provide that if production 
was not made, the complaint would be dismissed.88  The corporations did not oppose the 
motion, and the case was dismissed.89  On appeal, the Supreme Court emphasized the 
long-established policy that maintained secrecy of grand jury proceedings in the federal 
courts.90  The Court held that the “indispensable” secrecy of grand jury proceedings could 
not be broken except where there was a “compelling necessity.”91  In reversing the 
judgment, the court concluded that no compelling necessity was shown for the wholesale 
discovery and production of a grand jury transcript under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.92  
                                                 
85 See id. at 679. 
 
86 See id.  
 
87 See id. Interestingly, the district court held that It rested on the ground that the 
Government  was using the transcript in preparation for trial, that it would be useful to 
the corporations in their preparation, that only in this way could the corporations get the 
information. 
 
88 See id. at 682. 
 
89 See id.  
 
90 See id. Along these lines, the court stated, The indispensable secrecy of grand jury 
proceedings must not be broken except where there is a compelling necessity. There are 
instances when that need will outweigh the countervailing policy but the reasons must be 
shown with particularity. 
 
91 See id. at 683 
 




Similarly, in United States v. Sells Engineering Corp.,93 the Justice Department 
sought review of a Ninth Circuit decision, which held that disclosure of grand jury 
materials to government attorneys and their assistants for use in a civil suit was not 
permissible.94  The Justice Department argued that its attorneys were entitled to have 
automatic access to grand jury materials under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i).95  The 
Ninth Circuit held that access was permissible only pursuant to a court order obtained 
upon the showing of a particularized need.96  The government further asserted that the 
court below had not correctly applied the “particularized-need” standard.97  
In affirming the Ninth Circuit decision, the Supreme Court held that disclosure as 
of right under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i) applied only to those attorneys who 
conducted the criminal matters to which the materials pertained.98  According to the 
Court, this conclusion was mandated by the general purposes of grand jury secrecy, by 
the limited reasons for which government attorneys were granted access to grand jury 
materials for criminal use, and by the legislative history of Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e).99  The 
Court also agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s statement that the fact that the grand jury 
                                                 
93 463 U.S. 418 (1983).  
 
94 See id.  
 
95 See id.   
 
96 See id.  
 
97 See id.  
 
98 See id. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i) permits disclosure of grand jury materials without 
a court order to an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such 
attorney’s duty.   
 
99 See id.  
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materials were rationally related to the civil suit did not satisfy the particularized need 
standard for granting court-ordered access.100 
The Sells Court emphasized that the grand jury would in fact be unable to 
function if the secrecy of its proceedings were not carefully maintained.  Indeed, the 
Court has gone so far as to call grand jury secrecy “indispensable.”101  Sells and Procter 
collectively represent the court’s staunch unwillingness to depart from grand jury 
secrecy.  The Court in Sells established a higher threshold by strengthening the 
particularized needs analysis. In both these cases the court’s emphasis and respect for 
grand jury secrecy is virtually undeniable and almost absolute.  
Similarly, in Illinois v. Abbott & Associates, Inc.,102 the Supreme Court affirmed a 
lower court finding prohibiting a state attorney general access to transcripts and 
documents generated during two federal grand jury investigations of alleged bid-rigging 
in the construction trades in his state.103   In Abbott, the Supreme Court found that there 
was a long tradition of grand jury secrecy that important to the justice system.104 
                                                 
100 See id. In this regard the Court held that parties seeking grand jury transcripts must 
show that the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial 
proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy, 
and that their request is structured to cover only material so needed. 
 
101 See id.  
 
102 460 U.S. 557 (1983). 
 
103 See id.  
 
104 See id.  
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Interestingly, however, in U.S. v. John Doe, Inc.,105 the Supreme Court reversed a 
lower court decision and held that Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) did not require petitioner to 
obtain a court order before re-familiarizing himself with the details of a grand jury 
investigation.106  In Doe, an attorney who conducted the criminal prosecution, simply 
wished to use the material for consultation regarding the civil phase of a dispute.107  The 
Court decided that the Rule’s plain language contained no prohibition against the 
continued use of information by attorneys who legitimately obtained access to the 
information through the grand jury investigation.108  
The crucial part of the Doe analysis is the court’s ruling that the public benefits of 
the disclosure in this particular case did not outweigh the dangers created by the limited 
disclosure requested; the Court reasoned that disclosure of a summary of a portion of the 
grand jury record to named attorneys for purposes of consultation did not pose a risk of a 
wide breach of grand jury secrecy.109   The Court found the potential for grand jury abuse 
minimal where the civil use contemplated was simply consultation with various 
government lawyers about the prudence of proceeding with a civil action.   
                                                 
105 481 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 
106 See id.  
 
107 See id.  
 
108 See id at 108.  
 
109 See id. That being said the court made it clear that is was not retracting on the “case 
law that had developed in response to requests for disclosure by private parties had 




Because of Doe’s factual context, the case cannot be interpreted as a departure 
from the Sells and Procter holdings.  The case nonetheless opens the door for grand jury 
disclosure by demonstrating the Court’s willingness to allow such disclosure where the 
aggregate effect on grand jury secrecy is minimal. This is an important point in 
considering whether the Patriot Act’s exception accommodates the Supreme Court’s 
reverence and respect for grand jury secrecy and its underlying policies.110  
In United States v. Williams,111 the government challenged a Tenth Circuit 
decision dismissing an investor’s indictment for making false statements to a bank 
because the prosecutor had failed to fulfill its obligation to present “substantial 
exculpatory evidence” to the grand jury.112 The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal 
holding that the rule requiring disclosure to the grand jury of “substantial exculpatory 
evidence” was not supported by the trial court’s “supervisory power.”113 
Essential to this holding was the court’s general findings with respect to the grand 
jury as an institution.  Along these lines the court stated that the 
grand jury ‘is a constitutional fixture in its own right.’ The whole 
theory of its function is that it belongs to no branch of the 
institutional Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee 
between the Government and the people. Although the grand jury 
normally operates, of course, in the courthouse and under judicial 
                                                 
110 See infra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.  
 
111 504 U.S. 36 (1992).  
 
112 See id.  
 
113 See id. at 45.  The Court’s reversal hinged on the grand jury as an institution over 
whose functioning the courts did not preside.  The Court found that the rule was 
inconsistent with the traditional function of the grand jury, which was to determine 
whether enough evidence existed to prosecute, not to allow the accused to put on a 
defense. The Court refused to convert a non-duty of the grand jury itself into an 
obligation of the prosecutor. 
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auspices, its institutional relationship with the Judicial Branch has 
traditionally been, so to speak, at arm's length. Judges' direct 
involvement in the functioning of the grand jury has generally been 
confined to the constitutive one of calling the grand jurors together 
and administering their oaths of office. [citations omitted]114 
 
As such, the Court focused on the independence of the grand jury, an independence that 
is arguably breached when the government mandates grand jury information sharing with 
enforcement agencies.  Similar to Sells and its predecessors, Williams upholds and 
safeguards the sanctity of the grand jury.115  While Sells and prior cases aimed to protect 
the secrecy of grand jury information, Williams safeguarded the independence of the 
institution.  
Both the independence and secrecy of the grand jury have been potentially 
subverted by the Patriot Act amendments to Rule 6.116  Several common themes pervade 
the Supreme Court’s review of grand jury disclosure disputes. The Court has been 
reluctant to allow for disclosure and when it has allowed it, it has done so in a restricted 
and limited manner. The concerns for grand jury abuse have been prevalent, and the 
Court has persistently applied the policies underlying secrecy as a ground for not 
allowing disclosure. Congress felt that there was no need for judicial approval in matters 
of national security. The next part will assess whether this is a sound policy and whether 
this accommodates the traditional judicial frameworks and concerns. 
A. Reconciling Supreme Court Precedent and the New Exception 
                                                 
114 See id. at 47.  
 
115 See id.  
 
116 See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. 
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Under the Patriot Act’s amendment, Congress has made the policy choice of 
allowing grand jury disclosure; a choice that, until the Act’s passage, has been subject to 
judicial review.117  Following heated legislative debate surrounding the court approval 
requirement, Congress has made the decision to tip the balance in favor of national 
security.118  After reviewing the relevant Supreme Court cases it is clear that the Court 
has been more careful in safeguarding disclosure than Congress has been.   
Under the recent Changes to Rule 6(e), Congress has opened the door for grand 
jury disclosure without court approval.  Many question Congress’ action in this regard.  
The policy underlying Congress’ amendment relates to the failure of law enforcement 
and the intelligence community in sharing of crucial information that was ultimately part 
of the cause for 9-11 terrorist attacks.   
Central to this exception is enhancing the coordination of law enforcement, 
defense, and national security efforts.  Combating the newly emerging face of terrorism 
necessarily requires increased coordination between police officers, intelligence agents, 
and the armed forces.119  A good case can be made for an exception permitting the 
disclosure of some grand jury materials regarding foreign intelligence and 
                                                 
117 For more on this point see generally Sara Sun Beale & James E. Felman, The 
Consequences of Enlisting Federal Grand Juries in the War on Terrorism: Assessing the 
USA PATRIOT Act’s Changes to Grand Jury Secrecy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 699, 
706 (2002). 
 
118 See Stewart Baker, Grand Jury Secrecy Rules Help the Terrorists, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 
2001, at A14 (stating that senate negotiators stalled the entire bill over a proposal 
authorizing broader disclosure of grand jury information). 
119 See BBC News: Americas, Congress Damns U.S. Intelligence Agencies, Jul. 17, 2002, 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2134086.stm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).  
 
 29 
counterintelligence to federal agencies responsible for matters such as national security, 
immigration, and military defense.   
While national security is a strong competing interest that may arguably trump the 
policies underlying grand jury disclosure, Congress could have provided for a more 
limited exception, one that takes into account the Supreme Court’s strong position against 
freely allowing disclosure of such information.  Limiting the broad scope of the exception 
would better accommodate the policies and bring the Congressional amendment more in 
line with the views expressed by the Supreme Court in Procter, Sells, Doe, and 
Williams.120   
There are several things Congress should do to limit the scope of the new 
amendment. First, the receiving agencies should develop procedures to ensure that grand 
jury information is kept confidential to the greatest extent possible, and to sensitize those 
dealing with grand jury material to the need for preserving secrecy.  Congress can easily 
outline these procedures.  This would parallel what the Court has done in grand jury 
disclosure disputes.121  For instance, the Supreme Court has often explained that any 
disclosure of grand jury information must be limited to a specific function; disclosure 
cannot be wholesale.122  
Another safeguard that Congress can implement is allowing the Patriot Act’s 
sunset provision to apply to the grand jury exception. Although the Act includes a sunset 
provision, under which the changes made by the Act will end on December 31, 2005, the 
                                                 
120 See supra text accompanying notes 82-112. 
 
121 See supra Part VI for a discussion on Sells and Williams. 
 
122 See id.  
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amendments to the grand jury disclosure rules are specifically excepted from the sunset 
provision.123 The notices required by Rule 6(e)(3)(c)(iii) (instead of plenary judicial 
approval) will provide Congress with a way to assess whether the exception is operating 
in a functional way. By reviewing the notices filed by government attorneys seeking 
disclosure, Congress can give itself the opportunity to ensure that the exception is not 
leading to grand jury abuses against which the Supreme Court has been vigilant.  
Another area requiring improvement is the Patriot Act’s failure to designate 
particular agencies that can have access to the information stemming from grand jury 
investigations. Allowing “federal law enforcement agencies” with access to grand jury 
material is overbroad. This is completely inimical to the Supreme Court’s requirement 
that disclosures requests be granted only by a strict showing of a “particularized need.”124  
Indeed, “there are over 50 major federal law enforcement agencies”125 and “there are as 
many as 200 federal agencies today that have some criminal enforcement role.”126 For 
instance, there are “criminal law enforcement personnel functioning within the 
Department of Agriculture, the Department of Labor, the Department of the Interior, the 
                                                 
123 See Patriot Act § 224(a), 115 Stat. at 295. 
 
124 Indeed, “federal law enforcement agency” would cover the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Secret Service, the Postal 
Inspection Service, the United States Marshals Service, the Customs Service, the Internal 
Revenue Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,  
 
125 See NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT 6-8 (3d Ed. 2000). 
 
126 Id. At 6. 
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Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Food and Drug Administration.”127 
Specifically defining the agencies that become privy to grand jury information would 
better accommodate the Supreme Court’s policy-emphasis on grand jury secrecy.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Morton Halperin, testifying on behalf of the Center for National Security Studies, 
noted that the proposals “concerning the sharing of information on Americans with the 
intelligence community,” represent a “sea change in laws that have been on the books for 
thirty years” segregating domestic law enforcement and the intelligence community.128 
The criticism of this departure in the law has centered on the lack of adequate supervision 
and the overbroad manner in which grand jury information can be accessible.129  
                                                 
127 Id. at 8. The list can potentially get even longer: The following are among the agencies 
identified in the NATIONAL SECURITY ACT as being within the “intelligence community:” 
50 U.S.C. § 401a (1994). the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the National Intelligence Council, the National Security Agency, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Imagery Office, the National Reconnaissance 
Office, the national intelligence offices within the Department of Defense, the 
intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Department of 
Treasury, and Department of Energy, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the 
Department of State. 50 U.S.C. § 401a (1994). 
 
128 See Legislative Proposals in the Wake of September 11, 2001 Attacks: Before the 
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 107th Cong. (Sept. 
24, 2001) (statement of Morton H. Halperin, Chair, Advisory Board, Center for National 
Security Studies). 
 
129 See, e.g., Legislative Proposals in the Wake of September 11, 2001 Attacks: Before 
the Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 107th Cong. 
(Sept. 24, 2001) (testimony of Jerry Berman, Executive Director, Center for Democracy 
and Technology). Mr. Berman was particularly concerned that the proposal “required no 
showing of need and included no standard of supervisory review or approval.” Id. See 
also, Civil Rights and Anti-Terrorism Efforts: Before the United States Senate Judiciary 
Comm. Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Prop. Rights, 107th Cong. (Oct. 
3, 2001) (testimony of Dr. Morton H. Halperin, Senior Fellow, the Council on Foreign 
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This paper has suggested the adoption of several provisions that would curtail the 
potential abuses of wide grand jury disclosure, while simultaneously maintaining the 
vitality of the exception as an effective law enforcement mechanism. This paper proposed 
three revisions to the current rule: limiting the agencies that have access to grand jury 
information, enacting guidelines limiting the purposes and uses of the information, and 
enacting a sunset provision such that Congress may reassess the utility of the new 
exception in due time.  Enacting these three proposals would better reconcile the Patriot 




                                                                                                                                                 
Relations and Chair, Advisory Board, Center for National Security Studies). Dr. Halperin 
also urged restricting the kind of information that could be disclosed to foreign 
intelligence officials, limiting disclosure to officials “directly involved in a terrorism 
investigation, and “marking and safeguarding any disclosed information.” Id. 
 
